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Abstract
The concept of emergence is critically analyzed in particular with respect to
the assumed emergence of mental properties from a neuronal basis. We argue
that so-called contextual emergence is needed to avoid an eliminatory reduction-
ism. Quantum-like features of the emergent qualities are to be expected. As a
consequence, non-causal relations like entanglement correlations have to be consid-
ered as full fledged elements of reality. ”Observable extension” is proposed as a
contextual alternative to emergence avoiding the asymmetry between purportedly
basic and emergent properties.
1 Introduction
By convention sweet, by convention bitter, by convention hot, by
convention cold, by convention color: but in reality atoms and void.
This is the first and for all times prototypal formulation of a reductionist world view
given in the fifth century B.C. by Democritus from Abdera. The endeavor is under-
standing the world in terms of a limited number of ”primary qualities” of a basic layer
of reality like positions and velocities of atoms and reducing ”secondary qualities” of a
somehow subordinate ontological status like color and smell to the primary ones. For
good reasons, some version of physical reductionism is a widespread if not dominant
attitude in contemporary science. It offers an attractive reduction of complexity in
understanding large parts of our world and it takes profit from the impressive success of
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physics in exactness, certainty, coherence and applicability. The reduction of thermody-
namics to mechanics is often considered as paradigmatic for the success of a reductionist
program. (But see our discussion in Section 3.) Neuronal reductionism as a strategy
of understanding mental phenomena in terms of neuronal activities has many vigorous
proponents. This is another example of a physical reductionism, because the possibility
to understand neuronal activity in physical terms is generally accepted.
Eliminative reductionism is an extreme form of reductionism attributing reality only
to the basic layer. For instance, eliminative neural reductionism [1] attributes to the
”popular psychology” terminology only the meaning of an incomplete shorthand notation
for the true and exact neuronal description. This radical view is rarely adopted and will
not be discussed further. Much more widespread is emergentism, an attitude granting
to notions of the secondary, ”higher”, ”emergent layer” its own although ontologically
somehow subordinate status. The claim is that systems described in terms of the basic
layer will develop new and surprising features once a certain threshold of complexity is
passed. Many versions of emergentism are advocated reaching from a milder form of
reductionism up to a decidedly anti-reductionist attitude. In more formal terms, the
question of the interpretation of emergentism becomes a problem of the specification of
the relationship between two different descriptions or modelisations of a part of reality,
one of them considered ”basic”and one considered ”emergent”. Three questions are of
particular interest in this context. (1) What is the ontological status of the emergent
layer? (2) What is the novelty status of the emergent layer? (3) What about the
possibility of ”downward causation” from the emergent to the basic layer. Approaching
these questions we shall proceed as follows: (More material can be found in [2].)
First we shall present a very general formal scheme for describing and modelling systems
of most general type. It has been developed under the name of ”Weak” or Generalized
Quantum Theory(GQT) [3, 4, 5] arising from physical quantum theory by shedding off all
formal features pertaining to physics in the narrow sense and thus widening the range of
applicability beyond physics still keeping salient quantum notions like complementarity
and entanglement. GQT can be seen to be in direct accordance with basic categorial
fundamentals of the human cognitive system. GQT strongly suggests that quantum-like
features of systems are generic and that the ontological constitution of systems in classical
physics should be considered exceptional. This message is noteworthy, because neuronal
emergentism is normally inspired by a classical or even mechanistic world model.
Next we shall critically analyze the standard example of the emergence of thermodynam-
ics and arrive at the notion of Contextual Emergence [6, 7]. Then we shall investigate to
what extent neuronal emergence fulfills the criteria of Contextual Emergence.
Finally, we propose observable extension as a more symmetric alternative to the hier-
archical concept of emergence and give tentative answers to the three questions raised
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above.
2 Generalized Quantum Theory
World is never given to us directly but primarily only as it appears on our internal stage.
Naive realism assumes that the world, at least in essence, really is like it appears to us.
This is a very strong assumption underrating the active role of the human cognitive system
and the human activity as a ”model builder”. The preferred world model of contemporary
physical and neuronal reductionism exhibits the influence of classical mechanics and is in
danger to confuse a world model with the world itself.
In fact the appearance of the world is bound to fundamental existentials, constitutive
features of our human mode of existence and thereby also categorial elements of human
cognition, similar to Kant’s categories. Four of them are of particular importance for us:
(For more details see [8])
1. Excentricity/oppositeness : Every perception or cognition of the form accessible to
us is irrevocably bound to the figure of oppositeness by always being the perception
or cognition of something by someone. The epistemic cut separating the ”observer”
from the ”observed object” may be movable but it is never completely removable.
2. Temporality : The world is not given to us in the mode of a timeless panoramic
picture but rather like a movie or a temporal sequence of events which occur in the
running window of a distinguished ”now”.
3. Facticity : We do not so much live in a world of potentialities but rather in a world
of facts, which hit on us and occur to us. The ”now” is of prototypal facticity.
4. Freedom and causality are not in contradiction but offshoots from the same root of
temporality differentiated into past, present and future. They rely on each other:
Causality is required for freely chosen actions to have predictable effects and causal
regularities are detected by freely creating causes and observing their effects.
Weak or Generalized Quantum Theory (GQT) [3, 4, 5] is a conceptual core of quan-
tum theory, which arose from an axiomatic formulation of physical quantum theory by
leaving out all features which seemed to be special to physical systems. As we shall see,
it takes into account the above existential universals right in the heart of its structure.
GQT is not physics but a very general theory of the structure of observed systems. For
the purposes of this note, it suffices to give a short account of the vital structural features
of GQT. For recent developments and applications see [5, 9].
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The following notions are taken over from quantum physics:
System: A system is anything which can be (imagined to be) isolated from the rest of the
world and be subject to an investigation. A system can be as general as ”impressionism”,
a school of art together with all persons involved in production and interpretation. Unlike
the situation in, e.g., classical mechanics the identification of a system is not always a
trivial procedure but sometimes a creative act. In many cases it is possible to define
subsystems inside a system.
State: A system must have the capacity to reside in different states without losing its
identity as a system. One may differentiate between pure states, which correspond to
maximal possible knowledge of the system and mixed states corresponding to incomplete
knowledge.
Observable: An observable corresponds to a feature of a system, which can be investigated
in a more or less meaningful way. Global observables pertain to the system as a whole,
local observables pertain to subsystems. In the above-mentioned example, observables
may, for instance, correspond to esthetic investigations.
Measurement : Doing a measurement of an observable A means performing the investiga-
tion which belongs to the observable A and arriving at a result a, which can claim factual
validity. What factual validity means depends on the system: Validity of a measurement
result for a system of physics, internal conviction for self observation, consensus for groups
of human beings. The result of the measurement of A will in general depend on the state
z of the system before the measurement but will not be completely determined by it.
Immediately after a measurement of an observable A with result a , the system will
be in an eigenstate za of the observable A with eigenvalue a. The eigenstate za is a state,
for which an immediate repetition of the measurement of the same observable A will again
yield the same result a with certainty, and after this repeated measurement the system
will still be in the same state za. This property, which is also crucial in quantum physics
justifies the terminology “eigenstate of an observable A” for za and “eigenvalue” for the
result a. We emphasize that this is an idealized description of a measurement process
abstracting from its detailed temporal structure.
Two observables A and B are called complementary, if the corresponding measurements
are not interchangeable. This means that the state of the system depends on the order
in which the measurement results, say a and b, were obtained. If the last measurement
was a measurement of A, the system will end up in an eigenstate za of A, and if the
last measurement was a measurement of B, an eigenstate zb will result eventually. For
complementary observables A and B there will be at least some eigenvalue, say a, of one
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of the observables for which no common eigenstate zab of both observables exists. This
means that it is not generally possible to ascribe sharp values to the complementary ob-
servables A and B, although both of them may be equally important for the description
of the system. This is the essence of quantum theoretical complementarity which is well
defined also for GQT. Some people prefer to apply the term ”complementarity” to what
we call ”maximal complementarity”: Knowledge of the value od A implies complete inde-
terminacy of the value of B and voce versa. This holds for the position and momentum
observables Q and P of quantum mechanics. But according to this definition already
oblique components of angular momentum would not be complementary.
Notice, that a measurement will in general change the state of a system by production of
an eigenstate of the last-measured observable. This generic quantum feature is realized
in a paradigmatic way for the human mind under the first person perspective of self-
observation. It will also hold for human thought in general and for all kinds of discourse,
belief or decision systems. Quantum features like complementarity and indeterminacy
should be common there. Detailed empirical investigations of quantum features in psy-
chological systems have been performed for bistable perception [10, 11, 12], human thought
and the formation of concepts [13, 14], apparent irrationality and non-classical logic in
decision processes [15, 16], semantic networks, learning and order effects in questionnaires
[17, 9]. For further information see [18] There are striking similarities of the measurement
process with creative processes [19].
Non-complementary observables, for which the order of measurement does not matter, are
called compatible. After the measurement of compatible observables A and B with results
a and b, the system will be in the same common eigenstate zab of A and B irrespective of
the order in which the measurements were performed. In classical systems all observables
are compatible and possess simultaneous eigenstates, and the phenomenon of complemen-
tarity does not occur. It should be clear from our general structural consideration and
from the examples given, that this is a strong additional assumption. For general reasons,
quantum-like behavior of systems should be the rule rather than the exception.
We also see, how the above-mentioned categorial universals are built into the structure of
GQT [8]:
Excentricity is taken into account by the pivotal position of measurement in GQT. In
physical quantum theory the epistemic cut is known under the name of Heisenberg cut.
Moreover, observables, right by definition, assume the existence of an epistemic cut. They
are sitting right astride on it with a footing both on the side of the observer and the
observed. Temporality is present in the relevance of the (temporal) ordering of mea-
surements. In addition, quantum systems in general have temporal dynamics. Facticity
resides in the factual character of measurement results. Freedom and causality show up
in GQT in the strange interplay of freedom in the choice of the observable to be measured
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and the causal dynamics of the system.
Entanglement can also be defined in the framework of Generalized Quantum
Theory [3, 4, 5, 20]. It may and will show up under the following conditions:
1. Subsystems can be identified within the system such that local observables pertain-
ing to different subsystems are compatible.
2. There is a global observable of the total system, which is complementary to local
observables of the subsystems.
3. The system is in an entangled state for instance in an eigenstate of the above-
mentioned global observable and not an eigenstate of the local observables.
Given these conditions, the measured values of the local observables will be uncertain
because of the complementarity of the global and the local observables. However, so-
called entanglement correlations will be observed between the measured values of the
local observables pertaining to different subsystems. These correlations are non-local and
instantaneous. They are not usable for signals or causal influences. They are non-causal
order structures resulting from the holistic structure of quantum systems. The crucial
importance of non-causal ordering structures is a fundamental message of quantum theory.
The explanatory monopole of causal relations, often tacitly assumed under the influence
of a mechanical paradigm cannot be held up.
Comparing Generalized with full physical quantum theory the following vital differences
are worth noticing:
• In its minimal version and in contrast to other approaches [21], GQT does not ascribe
quantified probabilities to the outcomes of measurements of an observable A in a
given state z. Indeed, to give just one example, for esthetic observables quantified
probabilities seem to be inappropriate from the outset. What rather remains are
modal logical qualifications like “impossible”, “possible” and “certain”. Related to
the absence of quantified probabilities, the set of states in GQT is in general not
modelled by a linear Hilbert space.
• Related to this, GQT in its minimal form provides no basis for the derivation of
inequalities of Bell’s type for measurement probabilities, which allow for the conclu-
sion that the indeterminacies of measurement values are of an intrinsic ontic nature.
In many (but not all) applications of GQT indeterminacies may be epistemic and
due to incomplete knowledge of the full state or uncontrollable perturbations by
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outside influences or by the process of measurement. Notice that complementarity
in the sense of GQT may even occur as a consequence of different partitions in coarse
grained classical dynamical systems [22, 23]. In this sense, GQT is a phenomeno-
logical framework theory allowing to leave the question of the ontic or epistemic
character of indeterminacies open.
For some applications (see, e.g., [10, 11, 12, 17, 9], ) one may want to enrich the
above-described minimal scheme of GQT by adding further structure, e.g., an underlying
Hilbert space structure for the states.
3 Contextual Emergence
The statistical theory of thermodynamics is often considered to be the classic example of
a successful reduction and a well-understood emergence relationship. We already men-
tioned that emergence concerns the relationship between two descriptions of a part of the
world, one of them primary and basic, one secondary and emergent. In this exemplary
case the basic level is a system of (many) particles described microscopically by classical
or quantum mechanics with the positions, momenta and spins of the particles as funda-
mental observables. The emergent macroscopic level is described as a system of classical
constitution with different macroscopic observables like volume, pressure, temperature
and entropy. The macroscopic state is determined by the values of a sufficient number
of macroscopic observables. The macroscopic observables supervene [24] the microscopic
observables because a change in the macroscopic ones is necessarily accompanied by a
change in the microscopic ones but nut necessarily vice versa. Both the macroscopic and
the microscopic description are formally well developed complete theories making emer-
gence and supervenience exemplarily clear issues in this case.
On closer inspection the reduction of thermodynamics to microphysics proceeds in two
steps:
First, the detailed microscopic description of states, which is neither feasible nor even
desirable for a large system is replaced by a statistical description. This is done by first
introducing mixed states, i.e. ensembles or sets of pure microscopic states with an attri-
bution of a probability to each of them. In a second step, macrostates, defined by the
values of macroscopic thermodynamical observable are identified with appropriate mixed
states. There are many mixed states without thermodynamic interpretation.
Notice, that the reduction of thermodynamics to microphysics is not to be understood
such that in complex microphysical systems after passing a complexity threshold com-
pletely new concepts of a thermodynamic description arise automatically by themselves
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and from nothing. The concept of probability, applied in the first step is not newly born
but pre-existent. It is also applicable to small microscopic systems for which, as opposed
to large systems, a detailed microscopic description is still feasible.
Some observables like the total energy are common to the microscopic and macroscopic
description. In general, the identification of macroscopic observables like volume and tem-
perature is neither enforced by the microscopic description nor by the concept of mixed
states. It comes about by applying different contexts to a section of reality in addition to
its microphysical description. For this reason, Atmanspacher, Bishop and beim Graben
[6, 7] talk about Contextual Emergence.
For a successful Contextual Emergence relationship a further condition must be fulfilled:
The mixed states corresponding to thermodynamic macrostates must have a sufficient
degree of stability under the microscopic dynamics. Otherwise, these mixed states would
quickly develop into mixed states without thermodynamic interpretation. A change of
the topology of the states may be necessary to achieve stability.
Thermodynamics is a particularly clear case of Contextual Emergence. There is a
widespread hope, that other emergence situations conform with this example. This
amounts to demanding a lot: Both the basic and the emergent layer must be well formal-
ized and endowed with dynamics which meet the above-mentioned stability requirement.
As for the emergence of a mental from a neuronal description the situation seems to be
as follows: For the neuronal layer, a satisfactory formal description is largely available.
States and observables are essentially under control, perhaps with some restrictions for
the dynamics of larger neuronal assemblies. The situation is much more problematic
on the mental level. First of all, we expect it to be organized in a quantum-like rather
than a classical manner [18, 25], making reduction to neuronal properties much more
difficult. Moreover, there is no comprehensive description and classification of mental
states and observables. The dynamics on the mental level can in no way considered to
be understood. Exactness is sometimes attempted by restriction to a small set of mental
observable, which are, however, so much devised with an eye on the neuronal substrate
that reduction becomes almost tautological. The status of the stability requirement is
also unclear. Mental dynamics is largely unknown, and one has the impression that on
the one hand quite different neuronal states frequently correspond to similar mental states
and on the other hand sometimes a small change of the neuronal state often leads to a
large change of the mental state. Mental and neuronal properties will correspond to very
different topologies and partitions of states. It is just this difference, which makes the
”emergence” of a quantum-like mental from a classical neuronal domain possible.
In any case, contextuality will be decisive for neuronal emergentism at least as much as
for thermodynamics. The hope for completely reductionist emergentism for the mental
domain deriving all mental features in an automatic and cogent way from neuronal ones
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seems to be futile.
4 Alternatives to Emergence
Emergence and supervenience are genuinely asymmetric concepts distinguishing between
a basic, lower, ontologically primary and an emergent, higher, ontologically secondary
level. The vision of physical reductionism is a hierarchic structure of the world with a ba-
sic physical layer given, for instance, by elementary particle physics and above it a tower
of higher stepwise emergent levels like chemistry, life and mind. One may ask oneself,
whether such a hierarchic ordering of the world really has an ontological status reflecting
a real feature of the world or whether it is epistemic and arises only from a particular de-
scription of the world such that in a different description the layers and/or their ordering
might be different.
A frequently invoked argument in favor of an ontological hierarchy is concerned with
complexity. Emergence arises, when the complexity on the basic layer exceeds a certain
threshold. However, one should keep in mind that complexity is an epistemic notion re-
ferring to a mode of description. What is complex in one description may be simple in
another description. Consider the exemplary case of the emergence of thermodynamics
from microscopic mechanics. Experience shows that for thermodynamical systems far
from equilibrium the treatment of the fluctuating behavior of the thermodynamic observ-
ables becomes complicated to the verge of intractability. In this situation, a microscopic
atomic description suggests itself and, indeed, molecular dynamics is the method of choice
here. In this case, the direction of emergence seems to be reversed. As a matter of fact,
thermodynamic fluctuations were historically one important reason for the acceptance of
atomism.
Contextuality of emergence and the high degree of autonomy of the emergent level are
further arguments against an ontological hierarchy. As an example, the function of a
software is largely independent of its underlying hardware substrate realization and could
be achieved in many different ways. It is also conceivable that mental properties could
rest on a basis quite different from neurons. As far as physics is concerned, it is quite
uncertain, whether a really fundamental level has already been reached and whether it
exists at all. In addition, recent developments seem to indicate that elementary particle
theory is not understandable without and closely interwoven with cosmology, which ac-
cording to the traditional view should emerge from particle theory.
From the preceding considerations we see, that the ontological status of the emerging layer
is quite strong and independent and not strictly subordinate. Moreover, an ontologically
hierarchical order of the world is disputable. In this situation it is suggestive to question
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the asymmetry inherent in the concept of emergence with the distinction between basic
and emergent layer. Emergence is a relationship between two formal systems with dif-
ferent sets of states and observables both of them describing a certain sector of reality.
Neural emergence with a basic neuronal and an emergent mental layer is the example of
central interest for us. A more symmetric alternative to emergence in general and neu-
ral emergence in particular would be extension of the set of observables or more briefly
Observable Extension. This amounts to describing a sector of reality by just one formal
system with one large set of observables corresponding to both layers of emergence. For
example, rather than neuronal emergence, one considers just one large comprehensive
system ”man” or even ”man plus physical and social environment” which contains both
neuronal and mental observables. This is in accordance with a standpoint of neutral dual
aspect monism with respect to the matter-mind problem. We already saw that comple-
mentarity should occur between mental observables of the comprehensive system. One
can also argue that complementarity between neuronal observables on one side and mental
observables on the other side should be common [25]. So, in any case, the comprehensive
matter-mind system should be quantum-like in the sense of GQT.
For ”Observable Extension” contextuality is at least as vital as for Contextual Emer-
gence. The identification of additional observables is not automatically enforced by the
other observables but corresponds to the introduction of new concepts and contexts into
the investigation of the comprehensive system.
For complementary observables different values for one of them will in general change
expectations for the measured values of the other one. So, the basic dictum of superve-
nience ”Change on the emergent layer leads to change on the basic layer” also holds for
complementary observables in an appropriately symmetrized form.
5 Conclusions
We are now in the position to attempt answers to the three questions raised in the Intro-
duction.
The first two questions concerned the ontological status and the novelty of ”emergent”
properties. It should be abundantly clear from the preceding considerations, in particular
from the analysis of the paradigmatic case of the emergence of thermodynamics, that
contextuality is a vital element in the discussion of emergence. It is even more central
in the symmetric alternative concept of ”Observable Extension”. Unless one is willing to
adopt a radical eliminatory reductionism, the ”emergent” properties are not automati-
cally generated by the ”basic” layer beyond a certain threshold of complexity. Rather they
come from different contexts becoming applicable or useful. Finding such contexts and
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detecting their applicability is a subtle achievement of creativity whose origin is a deep
and difficult question [19]. As for the novelty of the ”emergent” features: They are not
suddenly born from the basic layer like Athena from the head of Zeus but they correspond
to preexistent notions and the novelty consists in their applicability or usefulness with
increasing complexity on the basic level. To give a very simple example: If the complexity
of a system of points in a plain is increased from two to three points the concept of angles
becomes applicable and useful, but it was already existent and not newly born with the
appearance of the third point.
The third question raised in the Introduction was about ”downward causation” from
the emergent to the basic level. It is formulated in a slightly provocative way as Kim’s
Dilemma [26]. For the status of the emergent mental level in relation to its neuronal basic
the following dire alternative seems to hold: Either mental properties are just abbrevia-
tions for neural properties in the sense of an eliminative reductionism or else, due to the
assumed causal closure of the physical world, they are impotent and causally decoupled
from the physical world. This leads Kim to the assertion that emergence and superve-
nience are formulations rather than solutions of a problem.
The assumption of causal closure of the physical world is questionable [2]. But even taking
it for granted, a smooth resolution of the dilemma comes from the concept of contextu-
ality both in the form of Contextual Emergence and of ”Observable Extension”. There
is no causal interaction between the neuronal and the mental level and, in fact, no such
interaction is needed. The relationship of the different layers is not causal in its nature
but a correspondence and order structure, which is due to the fact that the same part
of reality is observed from different perspectives. From the example of the emergence of
thermodynamics we easily see that the relationship between the microscopic and thermo-
dynamical description is not a causal one. Of course, the microstate changes when the
values of thermodynamic variables change, but this simultaneity in change only reflects
the fact, that both descriptions are different sides of the same medal. This becomes even
clearer if we consider complementary observbles in one and the same system. Nobody
would interpret the subtle relationship between position and momentum distributions as
causal effects.
Kim’s dilemma just results from an unjustified monopolization of causal relationships
as explanatory structures. Quantum theory with its inevitable non-causal entanglement
correlations lends yet another disproof of such a one-sided claim.
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